In this paper we consider the dynamic process of race track betting. We show that there is a close connection between the dynamic race track betting process and the pari-mutuel method for constructing consensus of subjective probabilities considered in Eisenberg and Gale. This enables us to show that there exists a unique equilibrium point for the betting process. We further show that the dynamic betting process converges to this equilibrium point almost surely. Therefore the sequential race track betting gives a natural approach to inducing the consensus probabilities in Eisenberg and Gale. These consensus probabilities are different from the average of the subjective probabilities which is used in the conventional way of combining individually held opinions into a collective group statement. We compare these probabilities and this leads to a potential explanation of the favorite-longshot bias consistently observed in the studies of race track betting.
Introduction

Some previous literature
Racetrack betting uses a pari-mutuel system. In the win bet market, the sums wagered on each horse are pooled, and the racetrack takes a percentage of the total pool. The remaining amount is distributed to those people who bet on the winning horse. Hence the payoff on each unit amount of wager depends on the proportion of total wager bet on each horse. Similar but more complicated systems are used for place betting, show betting, and some other possible types of betting. For simplicity, in this article we only consider win betting.
Numerous authors have analyzed horse racing data, and a negative relationship between rate of return and track odds has been noted consistently: favorites (horses with high proportion of total wager bet on them, or, in other words, low track odds) have positive expected returns (after adjusting for track take), while longshots have negative expected returns. This is called the favorite-longshot bias. See Griffith (1949) , McGlothlin (1956) , Fabricand (1965) , Ali (1977) , Snyder (1978) , Hausch, Ziemba, and Rubinstein (1981) , Asch, Malkiel, and Quandt (1982) , Henery (1985) , Ziemba and Hausch (1984) , and Brown, D'Amato, and Gertner (1994) . Exceptions to this bias are Busche and Hall (1988) and Busche (1994) for Hong Kong and Japan.
Several explanations of this bias have been proposed in the literature. One obvious possibility is that the bias may reflect a taste for low probability, high payoff gambles -a form of risk love. Weitzman (1965) and Ali (1977) estimated the utility function of the representative bettor and showed it to be convex. See also Brown, D'Amato, and Gertner (1994). Another explanation is that the bias may represents a general systematic bias in probability perception, see Thaler and Ziemba (1988) . Many of these analyses assume homogeneous beliefs on the part of the bettors, whereas in reality the perceptions of the bettors may differ. Ali (1977) considered races with two horses and assumed that the risk-neutral bettors hold heterogeneous beliefs about the winning probability of each horse. Ali supposed that each bettor's belief of the winning probability of the horses is a draw from a distribution that has the true underlying probability as its median value, and all bettors wager an identical amount. He showed that the favorite-longshot bias will be generated in this case. Blough (1994) extended Ali's analysis beyond two horses to an arbitrary number. He proposed a concept of consensus probability, which generalized the concept of median in a certain way, and showed that, if the consensus probability of the bettors matches the true probability, then with a restriction on the beliefs of bettors, the favorite-longshot bias results. Both of the above analyses proceed as if the bettors know (or can predict) the market established final odds.
The dynamic process
In this paper, we assume heterogeneous beliefs among the bettors, and consider a sequential dynamic model of the betting process. Consider a race with J horses. Assume the bettors are risk neutral. Suppose at the end of the betting process, the fraction of total wager placed on horse j is P j , j = 1, ..., J. Denote P = (P 1 , P 2 , ..., P J )
T . Let the racetrack take percentage be r. The net return on a dollar bet on horse j if that horse wins is (1 − r)/P j − 1. This net return is the payoff odds on horse j. Hence the proportion of total wager bet on each horse can be inferred from the published payoff odds on each horse. Of course the final proportion can be calculated only when the betting is over and the final odds are available. In the case when the bettors have homogeneous beliefs, the commonly perceived winning probabilities of the horses would be identical to P . This is why P is often called the subjective probability of the bettors. In this paper we use the name market probability (used in Blough (1994)) for P , since we consider heterogeneous beliefs. The favorite-longshot bias refers to the phenomenon that the market probability is lower than the objective probability for the favorites, higher than the objective probability for the longshots. Now assume the bettors all wager an identical amount, say, one dollar, and the bettors come to the window in sequence. We assume that the bettor arriving at a given instant of time is randomly chosen from a population of bettors in a fashion made more precise below. Suppose right before the n-th bettor is to place his (or her) wager, the current proportions of money bet on each horse are represented by the vector
(This is an idealization of the actual situation at the track in which the "current" payoff odds are announced, but with a small time lag.) Let the subjective estimate by the n-th bettor of the objective winning probability be represented by the vector
Since we assume the bettors are risk neutral, the n-th bettor is going to choose the horse that maximize his (or her) subjective expected payoff based on the current proportion P (n−1) . That is, he (or she) is going to maximize Q (n)
Here r is the racetrack take percentage. This is equivalent to minimizing
After the n-th bettor places the wager, the proportions of wager placed on the horses are updated to P (n) , and the (n + 1)st bettor comes along.
We show that this dynamic betting process converges to a unique equilibrium set of odds. These limiting odds depend on the distribution of Q. They correspond in the usual way to an equilibrium probability vector, P * .
For a given distribution of Q one may also compute the average vector having coordinates
The values of P i are often interpreted as the "true" odds as collectively determined by the betting population corresponding to the distribution of Q. We then study the relation between P and the equilibrium vector P * . In several reasonable situations it turns out that the betting equilibrium P * corresponds to underbetting of favorites and overbetting of longshots. This is qualitatively similar to the observed phenomenon, and may represent part of the explanation for this phenomenon.
Eisenberg and Gale equilibrium
Before we move on to study this dynamic betting process, we briefly review a pari-mutuel method of pooling subjective probabilities introduced by Eisenberg and Gale (1959), which we shall see is closely related to the race tracking betting process we study in this paper. Eisenberg and Gale (1959) considered a pari-mutuel model for pooling opinions among I individuals B 1 , ..., B I concerned with a race of J horses, with B i having a budget b i , i = 1, ..., I. It is convenient to assume
Let (p ij ) be the I × J subjective probability matrix. That is, p ij is the probability, in the opinion of B i , that the j-th horse will win the race. We assume that each column of the matrix (p ij ) contains at least one positive entry. If this were not true then for some horse j, p ij = 0 for all i, and none of the B i 's would bet on horse j. We could then eliminate horse j from consideration.
Assume each bettor bets in a way that maximizes his subjective expectation. Let β ij be the amount that B i bets on horse j. Then
and the total amount bet on horse j is
Notice J j=1 π j = 1. At an equilibrium state, each B i is maximizing his expectation. Eisenberg and Gale (1959) wrote this condition as
which states that B i bets only on those horses for which his expectation is a maximum. Eisenberg and Gale (1959) referred to nonnegative numbers π j and β ij that satisfy the conditions (1), (2) , and (3) as equilibrium probabilities and bets. They proved that equilibrium probabilities exist and are unique. Norvig (1967) presented a deterministic algorithm for reaching this equilibrium as the limit of iterated bids in the case of a finite population of bettors. Now let us come back to the dynamic race track betting process described earlier. First consider the situation where the random subjective probability vector Q = (Q 1 , ..., Q J ) T is supported on a finite set of points. Assume this finite set consists of I support points p i = (p i1 , ..., p iJ ), i = 1, ..., I, with probability b i , i = 1, ..., I, respectively. We define an equilibrium state of the betting process as one in which (1), (2) , and (3) are satisfied for some nonnegative numbers β ij 's and π i 's. By the results in Eisenberg and Gale (1959) , such an equilibrium state exists, and the π i 's at the equilibrium are unique. Notice, however, here b i 's are the probability masses of the support points, not the budget of a bettor. Roughly speaking, β ij is the proportion of people that has subjective probabilities p i and has bet on horse j, and π j is proportional to the total money betted on horse j. The meaning of (1), (2) , and (3) are then clear: at the equilibrium state, every bettor bets only on a horse for which his expectation is a maximum.
Dynamic equilibrium (continuous case)
We then turn to the continuous case in which the random subjective probability vector Q = (Q 1 , ..., Q J )
T has a continuous distribution with density function f supported on
(It is in this sense that the n-th bettor is randomly chosen from an infinite population.) The concept of equilibrium probabilities can be extended naturally to this situation. We define an equilibrium state of the betting process as one in which there is a joint density g(j, q) (with respect to the product measure of the counting measure and the Lebesgue measure on Θ), and equilibrium probabilities π = (π 1 , ..., π J ) such that
if µ q = max s q s π s and g(j, q) > 0, then
These are clearly the continuous counterparts of (1), (2) , and (3). Proposition 1.1 If equilibrium probabilities satisfying (4), (5), and (6) exist, they are unique.
The proof of Proposition 1.1 is parallel to the proof in Eisenberg and Gale (1959) of the uniqueness of the equilibrium probabilities satisfying (1), (2), and (3), with β ij replaced by g(j, q), µ i replaced by µ q , p ij replaced by q j , b i replaced by f (q). Therefore the proof is skipped here. It is possible to prove the existence of the equilibrium probabilities in the continuous case with a proof that is similar to the one in Eisenberg and Gale (1959) for discrete case. However, it turns out in the continuous case it is much easier to proceed with a fixed point argument, as will be seen in Section 2, where we show that there exists a unique set of equilibrium probabilities and the betting process converges to the equilibrium probabilities almost surely. In Section 3 we compare the equilibrium probabilities with the average probabilities. This leads to an alternative explanation of the favorite-longshot bias in racetrack betting. Conclusions are given in Section 4.
Convergence of the betting process
In this section we concentrate on the continuous case. Define φ : Θ 0 −→ Θ 0 by φ(q) = (φ 1 (q), ..., φ J (q)), where q = (q 1 , ..., q J ) T ∈ Θ 0 , Θ 0 is the interior of Θ, and
Then φ is a continuous mapping. If the current proportions of the wager bet on the horses are represented by q, then φ j (q) is the probability of the next bettor betting on horse j.
Proposition 2.1 There exists a fixed point of φ in Θ 0 .
Proof: Define η = min
where q is the point where ∂Θ and the line connecting q and (
Then φ * is continuous from Θ to itself, and therefore by Brouwer's fixed point theorem, (see, for example, Theorem 4.2.5 of Istratescu (1981)) there exists a fixed point q * ∈ Θ of the mapping φ * ., i.e. φ * (q * ) = q * and q * ∈ Θ.
Now we show that q * has to be in Θ. For any q ∈ Θ \ Θ, we have q ∈ ∂Θ by the definition of q. Hence q j 0 = η for some j 0 . Then q j 0 < η. Also, since q ∈ Θ, for any k = j 0 , we have q k ≥ η = q j 0 . Now we have
This means φ * (q) = q, and so any point in Θ \ Θ can not be a fixed point of φ * , therefore q * ∈ Θ. So we have
That is, q * is a fixed point of φ. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2.2 Any fixed point of φ in Θ 0 is an equilibrium probability vector.
Proof: Let q * be a fixed point of φ. Define
and π = q * in the equations (4), (5), and (6). It is straightforward to check that (4) and (6) are satisfied. (5) is satisfied since q * is the fixed point of φ. Q.E.D.
The above two propositions establish the existence of the equilibrium probability vector. Therefore the equilibrium probability vector exists and is unique by Proposition 1.1. This in turn implies that the fixed point of φ is unique by Proposition 2.2. We summarize these results in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 φ has a unique fixed point in Θ
0 , and this is the unique equilibrium probability vector satisfying (4), (5), and (6).
Denote the unique fixed point of φ by P * . The following theorem shows that the proportion of wager placed on the horses will converge to P * almost surely.
Theorem 2.1 As n → ∞, P (n) → P * almost surely.
To facilitate the proof of this theorem, we introduce the following lemma:
Proof: We will make use of the following standard result, whose proof we will omit:
Now without loss of generality, assume
Now we show that
So we have, for any l ≤ k,
By Proposition 2.3, we have
is a nonrandom number. We intend to show that X (n) is a supermartingale with respect to the sequence of σ-fields F (n) generated by {P (i) : i = 1, ..., n}.
Let e (n) be the J dimensional random column vector indicating which horse the n-th bet is on. That is, if the n-th bet is on horse i, then e (n) is the i-th unit vector. Then
, and
and it is easy to see that E(e (n+1) |F (n) ) = φ(P (n) ).
Hence we have
Therefore,
By Lemma 2.2, we have
Hence X (n) is a non-negative super-martingale, so it has to converge to some non-negative random variable almost surely. Denote the limit random variable by X. Also, since X (n) is a non-negative super-martingale, E(X (n) ) has a non-negative limit.
By (7) we have
This shows that the limit of E(X (n) ) has to be 0. (Suppose E(X (n) ) → ǫ > 0. Then
Since X is non-negative, we have X = 0 almost surely. That is, X (n) goes to 0 almost surely. Hence,
This implies
Theorem 2.1 shows that the race track betting process induces the equilibrium probabilities (of an infinite population).
3 The Equilibrium Probabilities vs. the Average Probabilities Theorem 2.1 establishes that in the betting process the market probability will converge to the equilibrium probability P * , and this equilibrium probability is the unique fixed point of the mapping φ. Now let us investigate the properties of this equilibrium probability. To do this, we need some further assumption on the random vector Q. Recall that Q is a random vector supported on the set
We shall model the distribution of Q by a Dirichlet distribution. This is the most natural distribution on a set like Θ. In the present situation, the use of Dirichlet distribution can also be motivated by making the following two assumptions for the formation of the subjective estimate of the winning probabilities:
1. Each individual bettor assigns an "ability score" vector (A 1 , A 2 , ..., A J ) for the horses, and calculates his (or her) subjective estimate of the winning probabilities as From these two assumptions, it follows that there is a constant c such that cA 1 , ..., cA J are Gamma random variables. (See Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan (1994), page 350.) Let the means of these Gamma random variables be denoted by a 1 , ..., a J , then we have that (
) follows a Dirichlet distribution with parameters (a 1 , ..., a J ). Notice that by defini- tion, (a 1 , ..., a J ) is proportional to the mean assigned "ability score" (E (A 1 ), E(A 2 ), ..., E(A J )) .
Hence, under the two assumptions made, the random vector Q follows a Dirichlet distribution with parameters (a 1 , ..., a J ) . We will not use these two assumptions in later exposition, and will work directly with the Dirichlet distribution.
In a race of two horses, we have the following result:
Theorem 3.1 Let J = 2, and suppose Q has a Dirichlet distribution with parameters a 1 and a 2 . If a 1 > a 2 , then P * 1 < E(Q 1 ), and P * 2 > E(Q 2 ). Remark 3.1 Since in this case E(Q 1 ) =
, if we assume that E(Q 1 ) and E(Q 2 ) are identical to the objective winning probabilities, that is, the bettors get the objective winning probabilities right on average, the theorem then says the favorite is underbet and the longshot is overbet. Ali (1977) studied the two horse race with a rational expectation model instead of our dynamic wagering model. The results in Ali (1977) imply that P * 1 < median(Q 1 ) under general conditions. Notice that since Q 1 follows a Beta distribution with parameters a 1 > a 2 , the distribution of Q 1 is skewed to the left, and the mean of Q 1 is smaller than the median of Q 1 . Hence the conclusion of Theorem 3.1 is stronger than that in the result of Ali (1977) .
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Note we just have to prove P * 1 < a 1 a 1 +a 2 . Since Q follows Dirichlet distribution with parameters (a 1 , a 2 ), we have Q 1 follows a Beta distribution with parameters (a 1 , a 2 ), and Q 2 follows a Beta distribution with parameters (a 2 , a 1 ). Now since P * 1 = φ 1 (P * ) = P r{P * 1 /Q 1 < P * 2 /Q 2 } = P r{Q 1 > P * 1 }, we have (here ⇐⇒ means "is equivalent to")
where the last step follows from a change of variable on the right hand side:
Therefore, to prove the theorem, we only need to prove
It is easy to check that 1 > cx
. Therefore, to prove (8) , it is sufficient to prove
or, equivalently,
becomes
where
Since B(1) = 0, to prove (10), it is sufficient to show that B ′ (t) ≥ 0, ∀0 < t < 1. After some simplification, we can see this is equivalent to
Now it is easy to check that C ′ (t) ≤ 0, ∀0 < t < 1, and that C(1) = 0. Therefore (11) holds, and the theorem is proved. Q.E.D.
Corollary 3.1 In a horse race with J horses, suppose Q follows a Dirichlet distribution with parameters a 1 , a 2 , ..., a J . If E(Q 1 ) > 1/2, then P *
Proof: Consider a horse race with two horses. Suppose the distribution of the subjective estimate of the winning probabilities is the same as that of random vector (Q 1 , Q 2 +...+Q J )
T .
Denote the limit vector in this race by P * * = (P * *
Dirichlet distribution with parameters a 1 , a 2 , ..., a J , we know (
Dirichlet distribution with parameters a 1 , a 2 + ... + a J . Since E(Q 1 ) > 1/2, by Theorem 3.1, P * *
1 }, and
1 , and we have P * 1 < E(Q 1 ). Q.E.D. Corollary 3.1 says that if the bettors get the objective probability on average, and there is a heavy favorite in a J horse race, then the heavy favorite will be underbet. Blough (1994) studied the J horse race with a rational expectation model instead of our dynamic wagering model. Under some strong assumptions on the logs of the probability ratios, Blough compared the equilibrium probabilities with a certain generalization of the median probability. Our assumptions are more natural than the assumption employed in Blough (1994) and we compare the equilibrium probabilities with the mean probabilities.
We have also used the computer to calculate the equilibrium probability in J > 2 horse races without a heavy favorite. In the case of Dirichlet distributions with various parameters, the equilibrium probabilities all show the usual "underbet favorite, overbet longshot" bias. We list a few examples in the following When we investigate the non-Dirichlet distribution case, the tendency shows in most cases, but is reversed in some of the cases. For example, in the J = 2 case, let Q = (Q 1 , Q 2 ) have the distribution of ( 
Conclusion
There is a close connection between the race track betting process and the pari-mutuel pooling of subjective probabilities. We showed that the race track betting process provides a natural tool to induce the unique set of equilibrium probabilities in the pari-mutuel method. The set of equilibrium probabilities is not identical to the average of the subjective estimate by the bettors. This means, even if the bettors get the true probability right on average, and even if the bettors are risk neutral, the proportion of money bet on the horses would not match the objective winning probabilities. This gives a possible explanation for the favorite-longshot bias, in addition to the risk-seeking bettor argument and various behavioral explanations. However, these explanations do not contradict each other, and we believe they each play a part in generating the favorite-longshot bias.
